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Need to Know: Vocation as the Heart of Christian Epistemology, by John 
Stackhouse, Jr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 280 pages. $29.95 
(hardcover).
DOUGLAS J. SCHUURMAN, St. Olaf College
In this book, Stackhouse, the Sangwoo Youtong Chee Professor of The-
ology and Culture at Regent College, aims to answer the call to think 
Christianly about everything. He does so by developing an epistemology, 
“an outline of just how Christians ought to think about whatever they are 
called to think about.” He offers this epistemology as “a kind of recipe, 
a generic method, if not quite an algorithm, that Christians can use to 
consider whatever lies before them” (18). Based on his core conviction 
that God enables us to know truth sufficiently to do what God calls us 
to do, Stackhouse develops a critical realism that forms a middle ground 
between “radical, unobtainable certainty and radical, unendurable 
doubt” (20).
Stackhouse assumes it is “axiomatic that God does not call us to do 
something we cannot accomplish” (71). Similar to Kant’s claim that “ought 
implies can,” Stackhouse assumes that “vocation implies ability.” Because 
truth is essential to the ability to fulfill our vocation, vocation implies that 
God gives us, among other things, “grounds for confidence in human ap-
prehension and comprehension of the world” (71). Stackhouse sums up 
his “critical realism” this way:
There is a world beyond myself, and a world beyond our communal de-
scription of it, and that world is accessible to us. It must be accessible to us, 
a Christian would affirm, or else we would not be able to fulfill our primary 
vocations. If we are to love God, we must have reliable apprehension of 
God. If we are to love our neighbors, we must truly know them such that we 
can care for them aright. And if we are to cultivate the rest of our planet, we 
must have extensive and reliable knowledge of it. Realism is entailed by the 
most fundamental tenets of our religion. (86)
Although sin disrupts human knowledge of reality, it does not so viti-
ate our noetic ability that we fall into radical doubt about our knowledge 
of truth. As Stackhouse sees it, this vocational basis for critical realism is 
“conspicuously lacking in so much modern epistemology” (71).
So what does God call humans to be and to do? Stackhouse speaks of 
our vocation in three ways: permanent, temporary, and particular. The pri-
mal and permanent human vocation is grounded in creation and directs 
human beings “to cultivate creation” as image bearers of God. Humans 
are called to love God, neighbors, and creation. The knowledge required 
for fulfilling what many call the “cultural mandate” is available to us. This 
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includes knowledge gained in various academic disciplines and arts, and 
through varied skills and practices.
Our temporary Christian vocation is to bring the good news of Jesus 
Christ to the world and to make disciples. This vocation is redemptive 
of sinners who fail to love God, neighbors, and creation and so need the 
restorative Gospel. The Church is called to model and proclaim God’s love 
for the world manifest in Jesus Christ. The epistemic implication of this 
vocation, per Stackhouse’s axiom, is confidence that God gives the Church 
the knowledge it needs to accomplish this calling through the Holy Spirit 
and Special Revelation, mainly found in the Bible.
These two general vocations become actual for people in their particu-
lar callings. God calls individuals to all manner of occupations, spheres, 
and tasks—hotel managers, carpenters, pastors, professors, husbands, 
wives and all the rest. Humans fulfill their general callings concretely 
through their particular callings. As we fulfill these callings, we can have 
confidence that we have the reliable knowledge needed for fulfilling them.
The philosophical aspects of Stackhouse’s epistemology are deeply 
shaped by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alvin Plantinga, George Mavrodes, 
William Alston, and others who advance what is sometimes called 
“Reformed epistemology.” He cites them frequently to support his own 
rejection of classical foundationalism, and his affirmation of having “war-
ranted” beliefs as properly basic in one’s noetic structure. He also shares 
their vision to think Christianly about every aspect of life and reality rather 
than to compartmentalize and privatize Christian faith. At a few key points 
he also relies heavily on John Locke’s epistemology, particularly Locke’s 
view of proportionate consent, the need for tolerance, and his claim that 
though we cannot have the absolute certainty Descartes sought, we can 
have enough knowledge to get along well in life.
Stackhouse develops a model highlighting the major resources for 
Christian thinking. Building upon the Wesleyan “quadrilateral,” which 
identifies four sources and norms for Christian theology (scripture, tra-
dition, experience, and reason), Stackhouse proposes a “pentalectic” 
that identifies five resources, not only for Christian theology, but for all 
Christian thinking. He defines this as “five-way conversation among our 
interpretations of experience, tradition, scholarship, art, and Scripture” 
(148). Though Scripture has primacy, the five sources should be seen as a 
“web” of complex, ongoing conversations. Christians should be open to 
new insights as these emerge from new interpretations of one or more of 
these sources. Truth gained from any of them is partial and ever in need of 
revision. We engage in the conversation among these resources through 
intuition, imagination, and reason.
For Stackhouse experience includes our senses, memories, self-aware-
ness, mystical intuitions, and more (94). He says that experiential ap-
prehension of the world is generally, but not always, reliable. Tradition 
includes the great minds, ideas, stories, and practices of the past. Since 
these are varied and often conflicting, Christian thinkers must scrutinize 
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them and creatively select and interpret aspects of tradition that will pro-
mote shalom and resist evil. Scholarship includes the deliverances of all 
academic disciplines. Christians need natural and social sciences, and 
humanities, if they are to fulfill their callings and “engage in a world of 
shalom-making” (107). The arts are also valuable resources for Christian 
thinking, since art-making “is a means of exploring and expressing what 
is, what is not, and what might be” (109).
Scripture is the most important resource for Christian thinking and liv-
ing. The fundamental purpose of the Bible is to tell people what they need 
to know for salvation and to “train us in the patterns of right living—
shalom-making—so that each Christian will be fully equipped to do excel-
lent work in the world” (118). Though he rejects the view that the Bible is 
inerrant in every grammatical, historical, and scientific way, Stackhouse 
affirms the historical reliability of the basic contours of the Biblical account 
of God’s dealings with Israel and the Church. The Bible is “true” in the 
sense “never false, never deceptive, never misleading” in telling us “what 
we need to know and in the way we need to know it” (119). He notes in 
passing that not all Christian groups affirm that the Deuterocanonical or 
Apocryphal books are canonical, but he does not raise questions about the 
impact of this on the Bible as the most important resource for Christian 
thinking.
In his discussion of the primacy of scripture, Stackhouse should say 
more about how the scope of Biblical authority relates to where and how 
scripture is primary. For Wesley the primacy of scripture is in the discipline 
of theology. Scripture speaks with authority on what we need to know 
and do to be redeemed. It is less clear how and why scripture has primacy 
in non-theological disciplines or other aspects of Christian thinking. So if 
you are thinking about the age of the earth and the universe, the reasoned 
views of astronomers should weigh more heavily than scripture. Or if 
one wants to know how to build sound buildings, the reasoned views of 
trained engineers should reign—rather than, say, the Biblical instructions 
for how to build Solomon’s temple. Here classical distinctions between 
“nature and grace,” “two cities,” and “two kingdoms” helpfully delineate 
how and where scriptural revelation holds sway, on the one hand, and 
where reason prevails, on the other. Thus for Martin Luther, reason (not 
scripture) is queen in the temporal kingdom, but reason is utterly unreli-
able in the spiritual kingdom where scripture reigns supreme. Stackhouse 
would likely agree, but he should say more about how scripture is, and is 
not, primary among the five sources of Christian thinking.
Stackhouse says we gain knowledge from these five resources with 
three modes of apprehension. Firstly through intuition, which he says 
comes in every day forms of having a sense for what is true and in ex-
pert judgments based on professional experience. Here he also includes 
what Alvin Plantinga calls “properly basic beliefs” such as Calvin’s sen-
sus divinitatis and Pascal’s “reasons of the heart.” Secondly imagination 
forms connections between our intuitions and the other resources in the 
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pentalectic conversation. Thirdly reason comprehends, evaluates, and or-
ganizes apprehensions from intuition, imagination, and the five resources 
for Christian thought. Contrary to rationalism, Stackhouse says reason 
remains “a humble worker . . . noticing, sorting, and arranging as best it 
can, according to the disciplines it has learned along the way and drawing 
on the right mode or modes of reasoning appropriate to the occasion, 
the materials presented to it moment by moment in the providence of 
God” (138).
Stackhouse highlights complexities in the interpretation and appre-
hension gained from the five resources of Christian thinking. These in-
clude social conditioning, brain neurology, and formative experiences 
that affect our intuition, imagination, and reasoning. Moreover, each of 
the five sources shapes our interpretations of the others. Martin Luther’s 
interpretation of scripture was profoundly influenced by his experience 
of forgiveness; that experience, in turn, was influenced by a new appre-
hension of a short section of scripture about justification by faith. Stack-
house searches for images, believing that the “hermeneutical circle” and 
“dialectic” among interpretations of experience, tradition, scholarship, 
arts, and scripture is too simple. “Thus the hermeneutical circle becomes 
a spiral, heading (one trusts) toward great apprehension of reality” (148). 
For Stackhouse, knowledge of truth is a complex web that continues to de-
velop and progress. He challenges “well-meaning Christians” who think 
truth can be known “exactly, completely, and certainly” (146).
He grapples with postmodern critiques, learning from them but con-
fidently affirming that there is a grand narrative—that of the Bible and 
Christian tradition. He takes seriously Thomas Kuhn’s work on “para-
digm shifts” without falling into the epistemic relativism or skepti-
cism that some use Kuhn’s work to support. He helpfully distinguishes 
“plausibility,” justifiable beliefs a rational person might affirm, from 
“credibility,” what beliefs out of the plausible ones I should affirm. He also 
proposes a hermeneutics of love as a counterbalance to a hermeneutics of 
suspicion (189). Love prompts communication, paying attention to others, 
giving the other the benefit of the doubt, and considering a change 
of mind.
The central axiom of the book, that God’s callings imply ability to know 
truths needed to fulfill them, is questionable in the call to faith and love. 
For Reinhold Niebuhr, and many Christian thinkers, God’s callings and 
commandments represent “impossible ideals” that bring about aware-
ness of our sin and need of repentance. Jesus’s directives in the Sermon on 
the Mount, for example, seem to some beyond what is morally possible 
for sinful humans living in a fallen world. Stackhouse is careful to say 
that the knowledge needed to fulfill our callings is partial and always in 
need of revision. From this we might infer that fulfilling our callings is 
likewise fragmentary and in other ways imperfect. But problems remain, 
especially in the vocation to believe the good news and to love God with 
all one’s heart, soul, strength, and mind. As sinners, we resonate with the 
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apostle Paul’s struggle: “For I do not do what I want, but I do the very 
thing I hate” (Romans 7:15). A deep Augustinian conviction is that we are 
in bondage to sin, and so not able to trust and love God unless God elects 
us and gives us the gift of faith, something God does not do for everyone. 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and many other leading theologians 
believe sinners are called to faith and love, but are not able to fulfill this 
calling without selectively given divine help.
This book does what it sets out to do, constructing a fruitful and use-
ful model for Christian thinking. One of the valuable contributions of 
this book is the way it draws together central claims and insights of “Re-
formed epistemology” while placing them in a broader theological and 
intellectual context. Stackhouse uses postmodern sources well, learning 
from them without accepting the relativism and skepticism so often af-
firmed by postmodernists. The book synthesizes so many complex issues 
and sources that it falls short of the more thorough treatment one might 
want on fewer topics. But it does make many stimulating proposals that 
will reward further work. 
Socrates and the Gods: How to Read Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, by 
Nalin Ranasinghe. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2012. 256 pages. 
$28.00 (hardcover).
DOUGLAS V. HENRY, Great Texts Program, Baylor University
Books abound explaining how to read Plato’s dialogues. By way of sub-
title, Nalin Ranasinghe self-identifies his contribution within this niche. 
Yet unlike the others, Socrates and the Gods says far less than it shows about 
how to read the dialogues dramatizing Socrates’s final weeks. That is, 
Ranasinghe devotes far less attention to self-conscious reflection on meth-
odology than he does to practicing a method. Therein are bound together 
the book’s central strengths as well as a besetting weakness.
Ranasinghe’s interpretive method defies easy characterization. Partly 
this is due to the “proudly autochthonous” quality of the book (2). Fur-
ther complicating matters is his “seemingly cavalier disregard of three 
and twenty centuries” of scholarship concerning the Euthyphro, Apology, 
and Crito (2). But even apart from these idiosyncracies, he simply fails to 
indicate straightforwardly his methodological commitments, an omission 
reflecting a pervasive rhetorical style given to enthymematic argument. In 
consequence, readers must work hard to identify his hermeneutic, his con-
clusions, and his reasons for them. While these deficits constitute frustrat-
ing liabilities for a “how to” book, no less is it the case that Ranasinghe’s 
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